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JOURNALISTIC MALPRACTICE: THE NEED FOR A
PROFESSIONAL STANDARD OF CARE IN
DEFAMATION CASES
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court said
"so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."2 The de-
cision halted a ten-year trend in the law of defamation. From 1964 until the
decision came down in 1974, the Supreme Court had consistently broad-
ened press protection, making it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to re-
cover from media defendants who disseminated defamatory statements
about them.' The Gertz decision, however, provided the states with the
opportunity to impose greater protection for their citizens, often to the det-
riment of this growing press freedom.
Although the Gertz decision did not recommend that the states adopt
any particular standard of liability in private plaintiff defamation cases, a
majority of jurisdictions have since adopted a simple negligence standard.
As a result, juries of "reasonable men" in those jurisdictions have been sec-
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Id. at 347. The rejection of liability without fault, meaning liability based solely on the fact
that the published statement was false, constituted a change from the common law rules of defa-
mation. See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
The law of defamation recognizes two types of plaintiffs: "public" plaintiffs, which include
public officials and public figures, and "private" plaintiffs, which include individuals of little or no
notoriety. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52; see also infra notes 25, 28, 32, 41 and accompanying text.
For the purposes of this Comment, a plaintiff who is characterized as either a public official or
a public figure will be referred to as a "public plaintiff." Plaintiffs classified as private individuals
will be referred to as "private plaintiffs."
Also, the terms "published" and "printed" will refer to the dissemination of information,
whether by the printed media or the broadcast media.
3. The trend began with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In that case,
the Supreme Court placed a burden on public officials seeking damages for defamation to prove
that the defendant published with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disre-
gard for whether it was false or not. Id. at 278-80.
For an overview of the Times case and other landmark defamation cases, see infra notes 20-48
and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. The simple negligence formula looks for a
breach of one's duty to exercise reasonable care toward another that results in harm to that per-
son. If the injured party can prove a causal connection between his injuries and the defendant's
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ond-guessing journalists who have printed unintentionally defamatory ma-
terial about private individuals. Thus, the basis for some editorial decisions
has shifted from an evaluation of whether the information is true to an
evaluation of how expensive it will be to prove its truth in court.5 As ex-
pected, the self-censorship that has resulted from this second-guessing ap-
pears to have decreased the level of false and defamatory information
reaching the public. However, the dissemination of accurate information
has decreased as well, since publishers tend to avoid potentially defamatory
stories that could lead to litigation.6
This "chilling" result of the Gertz decision has prompted some to ques-
tion the constitutionality of allowing the states to adopt a simple negligence
standard in defamation cases. Critics question whether the same standard
of care should determine both the validity of exercising a constitutionally
guaranteed right and the monetary liability of a driver in an auto accident.7
Such a system seems to contradict the Supreme Court's statement that
"[flreedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a
preferred position" in comparison to mere economic interests.'
Several states, in response to these concerns, have adopted a negligence
standard that entails a "professional" standard of care for journalists. The
failure to use reasonable care, the defendant will be liable. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
The key aspect of this formula for purposes of this Comment is that the exercise of reasonable
care is normally measured according to the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. However,
when the defendant is a skilled professional, his conduct is measured according to the skill nor-
mally exercised within the profession. Id. § 32 at 149. Such a standard gives deference to the
judgment of the professional.
As several commentators have noted, four of the six Gertz opinions used the term "negligence"
at some point in their discussions. Thus, it is not surprising that the states would adopt this
standard. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1427 (1975); Franklin, What Does "Negli-
gence" Mean in Defamation Cases?, 6 COMM/ENT L.J. 259, 259-60 n.5 (1984). However, there
was no indication in any of the Gertz opinions of whether the negligence standard should be that
of the reasonably prudent person or that applying to the skilled professional.
5. Cf. Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
6. See, eg., Riley, Lawyers Who Look for Libel, Nat'l L.J., May 27, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (discuss-
ing libel lawyers who screen potentially defamatory stories before publication).
7. Cf. McChrystal, Reconciling Defamation Law and the Free Enterprise System When the
Media Provides Consumer or Investor Information, 17 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 183, 195 (1986).
The first amendment to the United States Constitution, which is the only amendment in the
Constitution to explicitly provide protection for a profession, says "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
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adopted standard is similar to that applied to doctors in malpractice cases. 9
Its intended effect is to limit findings of liability to cases in which journalists
are truly culpable, yet it also is intended to protect the interests of individu-
als in their own reputations. Adoption of this approach on a national basis
would permit the courts to better protect both the constitutionally guaran-
teed rights of the press and the interests of individuals in privacy.
This Comment will begin by presenting an historical background of the
law of defamation in the United States. Next, it will provide an in-depth
examination of the competing interests in private plaintiff defamation cases.
It will then propose a change in the standard of liability as well as a change
in the means of proof of liability in private plaintiff defamation cases. Fi-
nally, this Comment will examine several jurisdictions that have adopted
these proposed standards.
I. HISTORY OF LIBEL IN THE UNITED STATES1 0
A. Common Law Origins
Defamation has been defined as a statement which tends to bring the
plaintiff into hatred, contempt or ridicule to a substantial and respectable
group. 11 At common law, such defamatory statements earned no protec-
tion under the first amendment, since the harm they caused was said to
outweigh their contribution to ordered democracy. 2
A publisher who disseminated defamatory material under the common
law was held strictly liable for his statements. 3 Thus, in order to recover
9. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
10. For a good overview of the law of defamation up until 1975, see generally Eaton, supra
note 4.
11. D. SPENCER, LAW FOR THE REPORTER 81 (5th ed. 1980). More completely, defamation
is defined as a statement which tends to "diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in
which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions
against him." W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 111, at 739 (footnote omitted).
Historically, defamation has been categorized as either libel or slander. Slander is oral defa-
mation. Libel is written or printed defamation, including that which is disseminated by the media
and is preserved in some permanent form. This Comment, dealing with media defendants, will
focus on libelous forms of defamation.
12. See, ag., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
The Supreme Court in Chaplinsky expressed the sentiment of the day when it said that false
statements "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 113, at 773. Prosser also notes that "[tihe effect of this strict
liability is to place the printed, written or spoken word in the same class with the use of explosives
or the keeping of dangerous animals." Id. Defense of this classification rested on the great danger
1988]
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damages, a plaintiff merely had to set forth evidence that the defendant had
published a defamatory statement about him. A plaintiff did not need to
prove that the statement was false, that the defendant knew it was false, or
that the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care in determining its
falsity; 4 the plaintiff carried the benefit of a presumption that the statement
was false. Further, the plaintiff was not required to provide any evidence of
injury, since there was an irrebuttable presumption of injury to his reputa-
tion upon proof of the statement's publishing."5
As a defense to an action for libel, the defendant could assert either that
the statement was true or that it was in some way privileged. If the state-
ment was privileged, although false, the defendant was shielded from liabil-
ity for its damages. A defendant could assert a conditional privilege on the
grounds that the statement was a fair and accurate report of a public hear-
ing or proceeding. 16 In other instances, the defendant could claim a privi-
lege if the issue to which the defamatory statement related was socially
important, and if he made the statement in good faith based on a reasonable
belief.' 7 A final privilege-based defense was the claim that the statement
was an instance of fair comment and criticism of a "public offering.""
All of these privileges, however, dissolved upon proof that the defendant
published the statement out of spite or ill-will toward the plaintiff. They
of harm to a reputation accompanying the mass distribution techniques used by media. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 392 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
The justification for strict liability was to insure compensation where it was justified yet diffi-
cult or impossible to prove. Eaton, supra note 4, at 1357. It also gave the plaintiff an opportunity
publicly to clear his name of the cloud placed on it by the defamatory statement. Id. at 1359.
14. Eaton, supra note 4, at 1353.
15. Id. A distinction, however, was made between a libelous statement that was defamatory
on its face and one that was defamatory only in light of other facts.
If the statement was libelous on its face, meaning that the danger of injury to reputation was
apparent from the words themselves, the statement was actionable per se. In such a case, the
plaintiff was not required to provide evidence of damages, since they were presumed to have
occurred. Id. at 1354. A statement making a charge of "mental illness" would be considered
actionable per se. Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1959).
However, if the statement was defamatory only when examined in light of extrinsic facts, it
was actionable per quod. In such a case, the plaintiff was required to plead and to prove special
damages. Eaton, supra note 4, at 1355. The classic example of a statement actionable per quod
was a false statement saying that a woman had given birth when she had been married only one
month. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., [1901-02] Sess. Cas. 645 (Scot.2d Div.), 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432
(1902) (cited in Eaton, supra note 4, at 1355 n.20).
16. D. SPENCER, supra note 11, at 89.
17. Id.
18. Id. This defense usually arose in cases involving the editorial review of plays, restaurants
and other services offered to the public. For an example of the broad latitude granted in exercis-
ing a right to fair comment and criticism, see Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86
N.W. 323 (1901).
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also terminated upon a showing that the defendant knew the statement was
false or that he had reason to believe it was false when he published it.19
B. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2' the United States Supreme Court
added a constitutional dimension to the law of defamation by holding that
the first amendment bars strict liability for defamatory statements concern-
ing government officials;21 statements of this sort do not automatically for-
feit their first amendment protection because they are false or defamatory.22
The rationale of the decision was that the public interest in obtaining infor-
mation crucial to self-governance outweighs the personal interest of public
officials in protecting their reputations.23 In so holding, the Court said:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohib-
its a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
24
Implicit in the decision is the belief that a democratic society requires
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate in order to function, as well as
the realization that such debate might - and should - include criticism of
government officials.2" Thus, the Court set a constitutional standard grant-
ing the media great protection when it reports upon governmental activities.
Four years later, the Court stated that proof of a media defendant's
simple negligence will not establish the "reckless disregard for [the] truth"
19. Eaton, supra note 4, at 1353-54.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. Id. at 279.
22. Id. at 279-80.
23. Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
24. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court had acknowledged that the concept of the first
amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." Id. at 270 (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). Thus, the
Court reasoned, in order to guarantee the existence of this "multitude of tongues," the state must
be prohibited from censoring statements merely because it finds them threatening.
25. Id. at 270. The Court set out more clearly its definition of a "public official" in Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (candidates for public office and statements relating to
their fitness for office), and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (non-elected official with con-
trol over conduct of governmental affairs). For state court applications of this standard, see An-
notation, Libel and Slander: Who is a Public Official or Otherwise Within the Federal
Constitutional Rule Requiring Public Officials to Show Malice, 19 A.L.R. 3D 1361 (1968).
1988]
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that is requisite to liability under the actual malice standard.26 Instead, the
Court said that there must be evidence that "the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. ''2 7 In another case,
the Court extended its requirement of a showing of actual malice to those
plaintiffs the Court called "public figures." This category includes people
who, though not holding an elected or appointed office, have assumed roles
of prominence and influence in society.25
C. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
The Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 29 greatly -
though temporarily - expanded the first amendment protection afforded
media defendants in private plaintiff defamation cases. In Rosenbloom, the
Court extended the requirement of proof of actual malice to all plaintiffs,
both public and private, when the issue to which the defamatory statement
related was one of "public or general concern."3 The actual malice re-
quirement applied whether the plaintiff was a public official or an unknown
private citizen; it also applied regardless of whether the plaintiff's involve-
26. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The Court in Times recognized that a
vigorous debate on issues of public concern would inevitably lead to the negligent dissemination of
some false information. However, the Court decided that the need for this debate outweighed the
harm caused by such unintended misinformation. Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
27. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
28. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (athletic director at state university
who was paid with private funds) (a companion case, Associated Press v. Walker, concerned a
prominent former military leader).
The Court in Gertz, however, gave a more clear definition of "public figures" when it said:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence
in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public
figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. Id. at 44. The Court declined to define the parameters of this standard, however, leaving
the states to deal with an I'll-know-it-when-I-see-it definition. Id. at 44-45.
Because of this, later state cases applying the standard were unable to specify its limits. They
described it as a "necessarily broad" standard and simply cited previous cases decided under
Rosenbloom. See Comment, The "Public Interest or Concern" Test - Have We Resurrected a
Standard That Should Have Remained in the Defamation Graveyard?, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 647, 665
(1987) (quoting AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, 162 Ind.
App. 671, 686, 321 N.E.2d 580, 590 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975)).
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ment in the issue to which the statement related was voluntary or
involuntary.31
In so holding, the Court rejected as artificial any distinction between
statements defaming "public" and "private" individuals, choosing instead
to focus on the issue about which the statement was made.32 The threshold
consideration thus became whether the public had an interest in learning
about the issue to which the defamatory statement related.33
The Rosenbloom opinion, however, was a plurality decision containing
five separate opinions. None of these opinions attracted the support of
more than three justices,34 and a more decisive statement was needed.35
That statement came three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
36
D. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
The case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 37 presented the Court with an
opportunity to modify the position it had taken earlier on the standard of
liability in private plaintiff defamation cases;38 it was an opportunity the
Court did not let slip by.39 The conflict required a balancing of the consti-
31. The extension of the actual malice standard to private plaintiffs in this case found its
support in the Supreme Court's earlier decision of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In that
case, the Court looked strictly at whether the plaintiffs were involved in a matter of public inter-
est en route to holding that they had to meet the actual malice standard in order to recover.
32. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44. The Court said "the First Amendment's impact upon state
libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official,' 'public figure,' or
'private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication
concerns a matter of public or general interest." Id.
33. Id. at 43.
34. Justice Black and Justice White concurred in the result of Justice Brennan's opinion,
though they differed in their reasoning. Because of this, Justice Brennan's opinion gained the
controlling force. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring).
35. Justice Harlan, id. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and Justice Marshall, id. at 78 (Marshall,
J., dissenting), provided a glimpse of the future of the law when they advocated allowing the
individual states to determine their own standards of liability in private plaintiff defamation cases.
Both dissenting opinions, however, stressed that liability without fault would not be an acceptable
alternative.
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rosenbloom, 403 U.S.
29.
39. The Court formulated the issue as being whether a media defendant can claim constitu-
tional protection when its defamatory statements cause injury to "an individual who is neither a
public official nor a public figure." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332. This "definition by exclusion" is the
closest the Court came to defining the concept of the private plaintiff, yet it used the phrase
throughout its decision.
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tutionally guaranteed right to freedom of the press against the rights of an
individual to protect his own good name.4 The result was a compromise.
The Court first acknowledged that the states have a stronger interest in
protecting private individuals from defamation than in protecting public
figures or officials from such harm.4 1 As a result, the Court decided the
states should retain substantial latitude in regulating this area of defamation
law.12 The Court then proceeded to reject the Rosenbloom decision's appli-
cation of the actual malice standard to all cases concerning issues of "public
or general interest"4 3 regardless of the plaintiff's status.' The opinion
noted that such a system furthers neither the interests of the state in pro-
tecting its citizens nor the rights of the public to enjoy a free press."a
As a result of this setting of priorities, the Court held that "so long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."46 The decision
went on to say, however, that states could not award punitive or presumed
damages absent a showing of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth in the defendant's statements.a7 In a later case, the Court held that
40. Id. at 342.
41. Id. at 343. This difference in interests stems from the idea that private citizens have less
access to the media than do public figures or officials, so they have fewer opportunities to redress
their injuries through means of self-help. Thus, the states are expected to provide an avenue of
remedy through the courts. Id. at 344. Also, the Court recognized that public figures and officials
have purposefully subjected themselves to public scrutiny in a way that private individuals have
not. Id. at 344-45. Because of this, the public figure or official is less deserving of state protection
than is the private individual. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
43. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44; see also supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46. The Court pointed out that such a distinction in essence left to
trial judges the determination of "what information is relevant to self-government." Id. at 346
(quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
45. Id. at 345-46. This fact was illustrated well in an examination of the judicial latitude
involved in the "general or public interest" standard. The Court pointed out that if a judge de-
cided that the defamatory statement addressed an issue of public interest, a successful plaintiff
would have to prove actual malice. This burden greatly reduced his likelihood of recovery, regard-
less of the extent of injury. However, if a judge decided that the statement was unrelated to a
public issue, the defendant would be held strictly liable for it under common law, despite all of his
precautions to ensure its accuracy. Id.
46. Id. The Court explained that the decision "recognizes the strength of the legitimate state
interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press
and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." Id. at 348.
47. Id. at 349. Presumed damages stem from the common law principles under which inju-
ries are inferred from the fact of publication. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. The
Court explained that presumed damages should not be allowed for less than a showing of actual
malice because the states have no interest in awarding damages that are in excess of actual injury.
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where the defamatory statement relates to a matter of public concern, the
plaintiff will bear the burden of proving both the falsity of the statement
and the fault of the defendant in making the statement.48
E. State Applications of Gertz
In the wake of the Gertz decision, the individual states have approached
the task of establishing their own particular balances between the individ-
ual's right to protect his reputation and the public's right to a free press.
The majority of states have adopted some form of the negligence standard
of liability.49 Under this approach, liability is generally premised on a sim-
Id. The Court asserted the same grounds for barring recovery of punitive damages without a
showing of actual malice. Id. at 350.
But in a recent case involving a non-media defendant, the Supreme Court said that punitive
damages may be awarded without a showing of actual malice when the "defamatory statements
do not involve matters of public concern." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). In that case, a credit reporting agency distributed an inaccurate credit
report concerning the plaintiff. It is unclear how much, if any, media protection the Court with-
drew with the decision. The plurality opinion said the holding did not turn on the economic or
commercial nature of the speech involved nor on the non-media nature of the defendant. This
Comment, however, is directed at initial showings of fault and will assume that the issue to which
the statement relates is a matter of public concern. Therefore, Greenmoss Builders will not be
discussed in detail.
48. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspa-
pers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628,
590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33
Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975); Re v. Gannett Co.,Inc., 480 A.2d 662 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984),
aff'd, 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1980); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239
(Fla. 1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317 S.E.2d 534 (1984); Cahill v.
Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d
184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975);
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 975 (1982); Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied,
320 So. 2d 203 (La. 1975) (specifically approving decision); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d
161 (1975); Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985); Brewer
v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Mississippi law), cert denied,
452 U.S. 962 (1981); Hyde v. Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1226 (1983); Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978); McCusker v. Valley
News, 121 N.H. 258, 428 A.2d 493 (1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981); Marchiondo v.
Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982); Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233,
228 S.E.2d 766 (1976); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d
105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc.,
549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, Inc., 65 Or. App. 29, 670 P.2d
616 (1983), aff'd, 298 Or. 434, 693 P.2d 35 (1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Mathis v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania law);
DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 292
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pie negligence standard, which inquires whether the defendant's actions de-
parted from the standard of care normally exercised by a reasonably
prudent person. 0 Five of these negligence states, however, have adopted a
higher standard of liability that entails a "professional" standard of care.
This scheme examines whether the defendant's conduct departed from the
standards of skill and care normally exercised within the profession of
journalism.51
At least three states have retained the Rosenbloom requirement that pri-
vate plaintiffs prove actual malice in order to recover. 2 New York has
instituted a standard that requires private plaintiffs to show that the pub-
lishing of the statement was "grossly irresponsible" conduct.5 3
II. PRIVATE PLAINTIFF DEFAMATION LAW - COMPETING INTERESTS
The laws governing defamation of private individuals seek to balance
two competing values: (1) the legitimate state interest in compensating in-
dividuals for the harm defamatory falsehoods inflict on them, and (2) the
interest in avoiding media self-censorship that emanates from the constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.54 Both of these interests
form the foundations of a democratic society, and despite the apparent ap-
prehensions of some,55 they are not mutually exclusive. Closer examination
of the law in this area, however, reveals that a simple negligence standard,
as applied in most states, provides greater protection for the individual in-
S.E.2d 23 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569
S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981); Colombo v.
Times-Argus Ass'n, Inc., 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d 80 (1977); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325
S.E.2d 713 (1985), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1032 (1985); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash.
2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983);
Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982);
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976).
See also Annotation, State Constitutional Protection of Allegedly Defamatory Statements Re-
garding Private Individual, 33 A.L.R.4TH 212, 226 (1984).
50. See, e.g., Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 197-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99; McCall, 623 S.W.2d at
885; Schrottman v. Bamicle, 386 Mass. 627, 640, 437 N.E.2d 205, 214 (1982).
51. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of these cases.
52. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit
Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978).
53. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, -, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); Martin v. Griffin Televi-
sion, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 90 (Okla. 1976).
55. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J., dissenting).
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terest in reputation than for press freedom. The result is unwarranted me-
dia self-censorship.
The United States Supreme Court, in examining these interests, has said
that an individual's right to protect his reputation "reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being
- a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." 6 Individ-
uals sacrifice this right, to some degree, when they thrust themselves into
the spotlight in order to influence the resolution of public questions." This
understanding, however, seems to justify greater protection for those who
choose to go unnoticed - protection for those private individuals who
make up the vast majority of this country's population.
While the courts view the public figure and the public official as individ-
uals "assuming the risk" of rigorous public inquiry,5 8 they view the private
individual as one making a conscious decision to avoid such scrutiny and its
accompanying criticism. 9 In essence, the private individual is seen as more
worthy of protection. Thus, even if a publisher suspects a private individual
of committing a morally reprehensible act, he must be aware that the dis-
semination of that suspicion may not be considered vital to our self-govern-
ance;co if he publishes the rumor and it proves to be an erroneous
accusation, he may suffer civil liability for his action. However, if he pub-
lishes the same false report about a public official, he is less likely to incur
liability, since these statements are considered important in shaping the
well-informed populace requisite to self-governance. In taking this ap-
proach, the law of defamation merely attempts to protect the undisturbed
anonymity to which most of us have become accustomed in our daily lives.
This interest consists of a freedom of choice that the media cannot, on their
own volition, take from the citizens.
56. Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
57. Id. at 351; see also supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
58. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
A recent example of this heightened public scrutiny is the 1987 Supreme Court confirmation
hearings. In those hearings, members of Congress quizzed Judge Robert Bork about his past
decisions and about his opinions on a myriad of legal issues. His nomination eventually was
rejected. The next nominee, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, withdrew from consideration when intense
media scrutiny revealed that he had experimented with marijuana while teaching law at Harvard
University.
59. Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), dismissed this public-private plaintiff distinction as a "legal fiction." Id. at 48. He said the
public interest transcends the status of the plaintiff, and such a distinction "bears little relation-
ship either to the values protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society." Id. at
47.




The private plaintiff's limited access to the media serves as a further
justification for increased protection of his rights.61 The courts recognize
that a public figure or official is more likely than a private individual to have
access to the press as a means of rebutting any false or defamatory state-
ments. Thus, the public figure has a wider array of protections than merely
resorting to litigation.6' But the private individual, being of no great inter-
est to the reading and viewing public, is unlikely to generate the media at-
tention necessary to counter the harm of the original report; litigation is his
most powerful weapon. Critics of this basis for distinguishing plaintiffs,
however, describe it as an unsubstantiated generalization; 63 the reality of
press coverage is that although the public official may have press access,
retractions rarely carry a great enough curing effect to rectify the harm
originally inflicted. 64
On the other end of the balance of defamation law rests the freedom of
the press.65 This interest encompasses more than merely the rights of the
media defendant involved in the immediate litigation; 66 it includes the con-
stitutional rights of all media as well as the public interest in a free flow of
information. 6' The proposition that a democratic society requires a diverse
market of ideas, in which truth will ultimately prevail over falsity, is central
to the design of the first amendment to the Constitution, for it is the people
who determine what constitutes the truth.6  Necessarily, this system re-
quires the protection of some false statements in order to avoid suppression
61. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967). This assertion, however, presupposes
that media access is helpful in redressing the injuries of a defamed private plaintiff.
62. Id.
63. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion).
64. See id. "Denials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the
prominence of the original story .... [The ability to respond through the media will depend on
the same complex factor on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable
event of the media's continuing interest in the story." Id. at 46.
65. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325, 340.
66. The importance of a positive outcome to the immediate defendant, however, has elevated
due to the threat that a large adverse judgment could send a small media outlet into bankruptcy.
See Curley, How Libel Suit Sapped the Crusading Spirit of a Small Newspaper, Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
67. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must em-
brace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See
also Forer, Libel Law's Slow Disintegration; But a Federal Statute Could Help, 16 STUDENT LAW.
27, 28 (1987).
68. See J. Milton, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING
TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON COMPLETE POEMS AND
MAJOR PROSE 746 (1957), in which the author says "[lI]et [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who
ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter." See also Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of those statements that are true. Since the press is one of the greatest sin-
gle contributors to this diverse marketplace, restraints on its activities
should be viewed with heightened suspicion.
In addition, the free press has been described as serving the public as a
"watchdog" of its interests. Originally, it served this purpose most obvi-
ously with reference to the government by checking its abuses of power by
bringing them to the attention of the public to which it was responsible.69
In a related manner, however, the press serves as the public's "watchdog"
on society itself, exposing those who fail to live within the bounds society
sets, and letting others know more clearly just what those bounds are.
The press carries out this function not only by presenting a reflection of
society and its values but also by indicating the direction in which society is
developing. 71 From this role arises a need - to some an obligation - to
report on issues that directly concern private individuals. But strong
counter forces embodied in the law of defamation discourage some journal-
ists from taking the chances involved in writing about private individuals,
and society loses valuable information as a result.
The widespread use of the simple negligence standard in defamation
cases prompts conservative segments of the media to "steer clear" of haz-
ardous or controversial stories concerning private individuals. 2 Journalists
who take the gamble of printing potentially defamatory material about a
private individual rest their fate in the hands of a jury to assess the reasona-
bleness of the publishing. This in itself can be a hazardous chore,73 but
when one considers the negative opinion some segments of society have of
the media, it can become a losing battle - one which many publishers are
not willing to fight. So although the simple negligence standard protects
69. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521. See also R. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1974), for an account of the Washington Post's coverage of the Watergate affair.
70. This has long been a justification for newpapers printing a section listing people who have
committed crimes in the community. The section serves three purposes: (1) to warn the readers
about those of whom they should be wary, (2) to list in black and white exactly what constitutes
unacceptable conduct, and (3) to warn the readers that if they fail to follow society's rules, they
will be caught and punished.
71. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422, 453-54 (1975).
72. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374. "A negligence test would place on the press the
intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to
verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait." Id. at 389.
73. "No one with the slightest appreciation for the myriad uncertainties of common law neg-
ligence would rely on the belief that reasonable care will preclude an adverse verdict." Anderson,
supra note 71, at 460.
It can also be an expensive chore. One commentator estimates that authors and publishers
today spend an average of $200,000 per case to defend libel suits. Forer, supra note 67, at 27.
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the interests of the private individual, this protection is achieved at the cost
of press freedom.
Aggravating this tension is the realization that a distinction between
public and private plaintiffs is irrelevant when the defamatory statement
relates to an issue of public concern; the public either needs the information
or does not need it, and that need does not grow or diminish based on the
status of the plaintiff.74 But since the law affords greater protection to cov-
erage of public figures and officials, a legal bias exists in favor of those ele-
ments of the media that report on the workings of the "officialdom. '75
Thus, those less conventional branches of the press that cover the trends
and conditions of society - specifically magazines and weekly news pro-
grams - face the burden of either conforming with the mainstream or pay-
ing the price for nonconformity, possibly in the form of civil liability to
private plaintiffs.76 This pressure arises despite the recognized public need
for this type of information, even though it does not concern government
activities. Our political system has never looked favorably upon such coer-
cion to conform, especially when the exercise of a constitutional right hangs
in the balance. Indeed, the senselessness of such pressure becomes clear
when one realizes that it causes the media to bypass coverage of some topics
deserving of discussion.
These weaknesses in applying the simple negligence standard to defama-
tion cases are accentuated when one considers that its application can result
in liability without fault, despite the Supreme Court's admonition against
strict liability.77 A jury judging whether a media defendant's conduct con-
formed to that of a reasonable man sees merely the publication of a defama-
tory statement, the falsity of which would have been revealed by some form
of further investigation. The reasonableness of this further investigation
from a journalist's perspective - considering the time constraints, the cost
of the verification, and the timeliness of the information - is immaterial to
the jury's deliberation. The jury is free to equate falsity with negligence
merely by seizing upon the most plausible of any unmade inquiries,78 each
74. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43.
75. Anderson, supra note 71, at 453.
76. Id. at 453-54.
77. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
78. Cf. Franklin, supra note 4, at 278. See Sibley v. Holyoke-Transcript Telegram Publishing
Co., Inc., 391 Mass. 468, 461 N.E.2d 823 (1984), in which the defendant published an article
falsely asserting that authorities were investigating the plaintiff for fraud. The article was based
on a police affidavit in which the plaintiff's former employees had accused him of crimes. In
attempting to verify the story, the reporter contacted the district attorney and the police chief, as
well as attempting to contact the officer who filed the affidavit. The two former employees re-
peated their accusations at trial, but the jury found the defendant negligent for publishing the
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evaluated in hindsight, consequently making the publisher the guarantor of
truth in anything he publishes.
The ease of a jury's leap from falsity to negligence becomes more under-
standable when one considers that the same inclination is present in a mem-
ber of the United States Supreme Court. Expressing his view that fault
should not be a requisite to defamation liability, Justice White wrote: "I
find it unacceptable to distribute the risk in this manner and force the
wholly innocent victim to bear the injury; for, as between the two, the de-
famer is the only culpable party. It is he who circulated a falsehood that he
was not required to publish."79 This view, however, fails to recognize that
despite the reasonable efforts of journalists, they will inevitably publish
some false information."0 The issue is to what extent we should censure
activities that may make this possibility more likely.
Unnecessary self-censorship has resulted from the uncertainty embodied
in defamation law's application of the simple negligence standard. Even if a
defamation suit is unfounded, the mere threat of incurring the costs of de-
fending the action can cause some journalists to decide against publishing.81
In many more cases, however, a reporter with a desire to avoid trouble for
his employer may choose not to include a relevant fact in a story simply by
hitting the delete key on his computer. These instances of individual self-
censorship are impossible to trace, and it is no easier to estimate their effect
on the flow of information to the public. But if even a fraction of the
thousands of working journalists feel this apprehension, the resulting de-
crease in the flow of information warrants a change in the system.
III. A PROPOSED CHANGE IN PRIVATE PLAINTIFF DEFAMATION LAW
A. Use of the Professional Standard of Care for Journalists
A more equitable approach to private plaintiff defamation cases in
which the negligence standard is applied would judge the actions of the
media defendant based on whether it exercised the skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members of the journalism profession. This "profes-
sional standard" would reduce many of the fears journalists harbor in
defamatory article. The judge denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, saying
the reporter should have directly contacted the complaining employees to assess their veracity.
79. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
80. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he sufficiency of a fact investigation and the reliability
of information derived from such investigations are peculiarly susceptible to second-guessing."
McChrystal, supra note 7, at 198.




deciding whether to print potentially defamatory material; the journalist
could publish, knowing that a group of possibly hostile jurors would not
second-guess him simply because they happen to disagree with the decision.
Instead, his compliance with the generally accepted standard of conduct in
the profession would act to shield him from unwarranted liability and un-
warranted self-censorship. More importantly, it would give the exercise of
a constitutionally guaranteed right more deference than merely whether the
community at large thought that exercise proper.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has adopted this theory of "journal-
istic malpractice" in defamation cases,82 though few states have followed
suit.83 In its determination of what occupations constitute "professions,"
the Restatement considers whether special skill is required to perform the
job; performance of a profession entails the exercise of skill described as
follows:
[i]t is that special form of competence which is not part of the ordi-
nary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of
acquired learning, and aptitude developed by special training and
experience. All professions, and most trades, are necessarily skilled,
and the word is used to refer to the special competence which they
require.84
As applied to the field of journalism, this professional skill would include
the ability to weigh the time and expense involved in further verification of
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1977). Section 580B, entitled
Defamation of Private Person, states in full:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person, or
concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely private matter not affect-
ing his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
Id. Thus, the Restatement adopts the widely prevailing negligence standard in private plaintiff
defamation cases. However, this negligence standard, as comment g to that section explains, is
intended to be judged according to the professional standard of care.
83. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the states adopting the
"journalistic malpractice" approach. For a list of states adopting some form of the negligence
standard, see supra note 49.
84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 299A comment a (1977). The Restatement's § 299A,
entitled Undertaking in Profession or Trade, reads in full, "[u]nless he represents that he has
greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities." Id.
Those occupations listed as professions include physician or surgeon, dentist, pharmacist, ocu-
list, attorney, accountant and engineer. Id. at comment b. Occupations constituting skilled trades
include airplane pilot, precision machinist, electrician, carpenter, blacksmith and plumber. Id.
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information in relation to the urgency of the story. It might also include
the journalist's peculiar knowledge and development of sources and verifi-
cation techniques as well as standard practices employed at his place of
employment.85 When one considers that courts have applied a professional
standard of care in cases involving "experienced milk haulers"86 and travel
agents,87 it becomes apparent that the skill applied in exercising a constitu-
tional right deserves more deference than merely whether a jury thinks it is
reasonable.
An added advantage of this professional standard is that it takes into
account operational differences within the profession by requiring different
standards from different "specialists," or schools of journalism.88 This ap-
proach eliminates the existing legal bias toward more conventional media89
by taking into consideration the various time and cost restraints accompa-
nying coverage of certain subject matters.90 Thus, what may constitute rea-
sonable publishing for a local television station might be an unreasonable
standard by which to judge a weekly national news magazine.91 A caveat
arises at this point, however, because although customs within a segment of
the media should be taken into account, they cannot set the standard of
liability if they are patently unreasonable.92
85. One court, in rejecting the professional standard of care in private plaintiff defamation
cases, said "[d]ue care in gathering information is not technical matter for which a jury unaided
by experts would have no basis for decision." Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, -, 437
N.E.2d 205, 215 (1982).
However, this statement misses one of the points of requiring a professional standard of care in
journalism. While some aspects of the field of journalism would require expert testimony for non-
journalists to understand, the purpose of this standard is less to enlighten the jury than to protect
a constitutional right from unnecessary infringement. For example, a jury might find it easy to
conclude that publishing material without an effort to verify constitutes negligence. However,
there are circumstances in which publishing is reasonable without verification, such as when the
story is based on police or court documents or when the story comes in over a syndicated wire
service. Anderson, supra note 71, at 465-66.
86. Jewell v. Beckstine, 255 Pa. Super. 238, 386 A.2d 597 (1978).
87. Josephs v. Fuller, 186 N.J. Super. 47, 451 A.2d 203 (1982).
88. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 466-67.
89. See Anderson, supra note 71 (as well as text accompanying supra note 75).
90. Among these would be the recognition that magazines and weekly news programs gener-
ally present less "spot news" coverage and tend to work on in-depth stories concerning less con-
ventional topics, such as the values and mores of society. Such stories create additional hazards of
defaming private individuals that are not present in some mainstream publications, so this hazard
could be taken into account in considering the defendant's actions.
91. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 467.
92. "In determining whether conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others
under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a
reasonable man would not follow them." RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 295A.
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Opponents of the journalistic malpractice standard object that if such a
standard were employed, media outlets would set their own standards be-
low that of actual reasonable care in order to avoid liability.9 3 However, a
media defendant's conduct, as with the conduct of legal and medical mal-
practice defendants, would be compared not only to the standards within
his particular community but also to the standards existing in communities
of similar character throughout the country. The circulation, budget, dead-
line pressures, space constraints and technological capabilities of the media
defendant would be considered in determining to whom his conduct would
be compared.94 Thus, incentive to keep standards high would stem from
the realization that their conduct will be compared to that of professionals
in other towns who may not have lowered their standards.
This professional standard in defamation cases would examine the de-
fendant's exercise of his journalistic skills and knowledge under the circum-
stances. The "circumstances" of each case would include the defendant's
estimation of the urgency of the story, his reason for publishing, and his
assessment of the likelihood that the story would cause harm if false.9 5
Thus, given the journalist's knowledge of the costs and time constraints
accompanying verification of any story, the standard would ask whether his
assessment of the circumstances in this case fell within the bounds of how a
reasonable journalist would have assessed the same or similar circum-
stances. If his evaluation was reasonable, the standard would further in-
quire whether his reaction to this assessment conformed to that of a
reasonable journalist.
The first of these circumstances, the urgency with which the potentially
defamatory story must be disseminated, is a key in determining whether the
defendant exercised the skills of a reasonable journalist.96 If the story re-
quires prompt publication to insure its significance, less rigorous verifica-
tion may be reasonable. However, if the publisher is a weekly journal,
facing fewer deadline pressures than a daily journal, or if the story is one
that would be as significant after another week's verification as it is without
such added delay, more investigation may be required. Regardless of the
93. See, e.g., Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982). "In such a
context it can only mean that the professional journalist should be judged by a standard below
that of ordinary care." Schrottman, 386 Mass. at -, 437 N.E.2d at 214.
94. Anderson, supra note 71, at 467.
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B comment h, at 228. In making this evaluation of
the different "circumstances" of the case, the importance of one or more factors could tip the




urgency of the story, if quick and inexpensive forms of verification are avail-
able but are not used, the publishing may be unreasonable.
The second circumstance that is essential in determining whether the
defendant acted as a reasonable journalist is his purpose in publishing the
defamatory statement.97 The courts generally recognize that one of the
main functions of a free press in a democratic society is to inform the electo-
rate on matters crucial to its self-governance. 9 When publication serves
this purpose, the societal good requires that less stringent verification stan-
dards be deemed reasonable; this avoids the public losing access to the in-
formation completely. However, another function of the press is to
entertain, and when this function enters the realm of discussing personal
activities, a false statement may have devastating effects. Because stories of
this sort are often not vital to self-governance, a requirement of more in-
tense verification to constitute reasonable action may be justified. However,
a journalist must further evaluate the more stringent requirement in light of
his knowledge of verification techniques.
The final factor considered in determining whether the defendant acted
as a reasonable journalist is his evaluation of the possible harm that could
result from publishing the statements if they prove false. 99 If the statement
appears defamatory on its face, a reasonable journalist probably would take
extra steps to verify its contents. However, if the statement is defamatory
only in light of facts unknown to the journalist, less verification would be
reasonable. But again, the journalist is required to make this evaluation
according to his knowledge of what it would cost to undertake further
verification.
Unfortunately, none of the foregoing considerations arise in a vacuum.
All of them may arise in the same story, and it requires a skilled profes-
sional, with experience in evaluating the time and expense involved in verifi-
cation methods, to weigh these considerations in deciding whether to
publish. In addition, the relative importance of one or more of these factors
may offset the negative effect of another, thus justifying publishing with less
investigation.lo But whatever the conditions and whatever their combina-
tion, a jury cannot replicate the experience gained from years of evaluating
and developing various avenues of verification.
97. Id.
98. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B comment h, at 229.
100. For example, if the information is critically important to the public, and it must be
distributed immediately in order to be relevant, the fact that it is a highly defamatory statement
on its face may be of less significance, thus permitting publication without investigation.
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B. Use of Expert Witnesses To Determine Fault
The use of expert witnesses similar to those employed in medical and
legal malpractice cases would be an integral part of implementing this
"journalistic malpractice" standard in private plaintiff defamation cases.
The journalism expert could testify to the customs common in the profes-
sion and to whether the defendant's conduct deviated from those customs.
He also could provide insights into the considerations upon which a jour-
nalist reflects in deciding whether to print a potentially defamatory story
and could give an indication of which of these factors may have weighed
more heavily in the decision in the case at hand.
Yet despite the sometimes complicated thought process a journalist em-
ploys in deciding whether to publish, the purpose of expert testimony in
these cases is as much one of constitutional protection as one of jury en-
lightenment. The stakes in a defamation case are not merely monetary; the
possible impairment of a constitutionally guaranteed right hangs in the bal-
ance of every jury decision. This fact in itself warrants the requirement of
expert testimony concerning reasonableness. However, when it is combined
with the jury's readiness to equate falsity with culpability, the need for this
testimony becomes even clearer.
The expert witness, by providing evidence that the jury must consider,
can help avoid the trap of jurors evaluating journalistic conduct according
to their own values and prejudices. 01 This testimony also could reduce the
likelihood that a jury will find liability simply because it disagrees with the
published viewpoint or because the published viewpoint is unpopular in the
community. In addition, the testimony of an expert would give a trial judge
something more substantial on which to base a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict if he believes the jury has chosen to inflict punishment instead of
choosing to find facts. Thus, the focusing effect of expert testimony could
serve to balance the scale that, because of some jurors' distaste for the me-
dia, already may be tipped against the defendant when trial begins.
C. Use of a Code of Professional Standards
In assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, an expert
witness could testify in reference to a code of professional standards, as is
done in other malpractice cases."12 Although an "enforceable" code of eth-
101. Cf. Anderson, supra note 71, at 466.
102. See, eg., R. MALLEN & V. LEvrT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 256 (2d ed. 1981).
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ics in the field of journalism carries ominous constitutional implications, 10 3
such an enforcement system would not be necessary to implement this form
of expert testimony in defamation cases.
In most jurisdictions, violation of a legal or medical code of ethics does
not in and of itself render that professional civilly liable." 4 In fact, some
courts have held that the ethical considerations embodied in these codes
constitute merely "some evidence" of the standard of care for the profes-
sion.w11 The same type of system could apply equally to the profession of
journalism, using one or more of the aspirational codes of professional re-
sponsibility circulating in the industry. 1 6 Thus, no technically violable code
of journalistic ethics is necessary for an expert to testify in reference to it.
Typical of the codes of ethics advanced today is the Radio-Television
News Directors Association (RTNDA) Code of Broadcast News Ethics.10 7
103. See, ag., Fairness Doctrine Alternatives, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 488 (Fed. Comm.
Comm'n 1987) (Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine); "Actively Censure" Out; "Mutual Trust" Now
In, 75 QUILL 46 (1987). Cf. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621
(D.D.C. 1982) (antitrust implications of advertising standards promulgated by National Ass'n of
Broadcasters).
104. See, eg., R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 102, § 256. See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983), which says, "[v]iolation of
a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal
duty has been breached .... [Tihey are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." Id. at 12.
But see Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 415 (1968), saying
"the standard [of professional liability] is that of ordinary care... governed by the established
standards of professional ethics .... " Id.
105. E.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980) (legal profession).
106. An added benefit of such a code of ethics may be to enhance the credibility ofjournalists
in the public eye. Some critics question whether this image enhancement actually would occur,
pointing to law and medicine as professions with codes that are rarely used. See Sheran & Isaac-
man, Do We Want a Responsible Press?: A Call For the Creation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms,
8 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 125 n.529 (1983).
But many journalists have recognized the need to enhance the credibility of the media, and
professional ethics is often the starting point of the discussion. "What the public sees is the vast
corporate enterprise of communication, presenting daily critiques of the rectitude and perform-
ance of others while refusing to concede that it should be subjected to an identical evaluation
based on the same kind of standards." Carter, Forward to C. CHRISTIANS, K. ROTZOLL & M.
FACKLER, MEDIA ETHICS, CASES AND MORAL REASONING at xii (1983).
107. Copies of this Code are available from RTNDA upon request and are supplied to mem-
bers of the organization. The Code reads as follows:
The responsibility of radio and television journalists is to gather and report information of
importance and interest to the public accurately, honestly and impartially.
The members of the Radio-Television News Directors Association accept these standards
and will:
1) Strive to present the source or nature of broadcast news material in a way that is
balanced, accurate and fair.
A. They will evaluate information solely on its merits as news, rejecting sensation-
alism or misleading emphasis in any form.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:63
The first sentence of the Code states that it is the responsibility of broadcast
journalists "to gather and report information of importance and interest to
the public accurately, honestly and impartially."'' 0 The Code goes on to
say that members of the organization will "promptly acknowledge and cor-
rect errors."' 10 9 Another passage of the Code that is of interest in this con-
text is the statement that members will "[r]espect the dignity, privacy and
well-being of people with whom they deal."" 0 The Code concludes with
the statement that members of RTNDA will "actively encourage" all jour-
nalists, whether members of RTNDA or not, to abide by the Code."'
Whether a particular act constitutes a violation of a code such as the
RTNDA Code of Broadcast Ethics can be a debatable issue in some cases;
what is considered a violation in one newsroom may not be a violation in
another. However, a code of this sort gives an expert witness a starting
point - something on which to base his judgments of the media defend-
ant's conduct. For example, an expert could testify to whether the defend-
ant respected the dignity and privacy of the plaintiff to the fullest extent
reasonably possible, considering the alternative methods of fact gathering
available in professional journalism today. In other words, could this inci-
dent have been avoided through the exercise of reasonable journalistic care?
The codes provide no specific benchmark by which to measure a defend-
ant's conduct, but they indicate the type of conduct to which many journal-
B. They will guard against using audio or video material in a way that deceives the
audience.
C. They will not mislead the public by presenting as spontaneous news any mate-
rial which is staged or rehearsed.
D. They will identify people by race, creed, nationality or prior status only when it
is relevant.
E. They will clearly label opinion and commentary.
F. They will promptly acknowledge and correct errors.
(2) Strive to conduct themselves in a manner that protects them from conflicts of inter-
est, real or perceived. They will decline gifts or favors which would influence or
appear to influence their judgments.
(3) Respect the dignity, privacy and well-being of people with whom they deal.
(4) Recognize the need to protect confidential sources. They will promise confidential-
ity only with the intention of keeping that promise.
(5) Respect everyone's right to a fair trial.
(6) Broadcast the private transmissions of other broadcasters only with permission.
(7) Actively encourage observance of this Code by all journalists, whether members of
the Radio-Television News Directors Association or not.
RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION CODE OF BROADCAST NEWS ETHiCS
(1987).
108. Id.
109. Id. § (I)F.
110. Id. § (3).
111. Id. § (7).
JOURNALISTIC MALPRACTICE
ists aspire, which could be considered some evidence of the standard of care
in the profession.
D. Enacting a Federal Statute
The enactment of a federal statute encompassing this journalistic mal-
practice system would hasten the necessary steps toward press protection.
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom ... of the press .... ,12 However, a federal libel law would
not abridge the freedom of the press; it would make the exercise of first
amendment freedoms less unpredictable' 13 and in turn would decrease the
level of self-censorship in media today. Instead of prohibiting the discus-
sion of any particular subject, the statute would be of a procedural nature,
enunciating the standards of care and means of proof by which the pub-
lisher of defamatory material could expect to be judged.
Such a federal statute would help deter instances of unnecessary and
expensive litigation by clearly defining the rights and obligations of both
parties to private plaintiff defamation litigation. Each party would know
more clearly what burden it would have to meet and what its likelihood of
success would be. Properly formulated, it could bring an end to litigation
based on little more than "name calling."' 14
In addition, a federal statute's standardization would prevent the ambi-
guities that accompany a basis of liability that varies from state to state. It
would end the multi-state publisher's uncertainty about what jurisdiction's
laws govern his case. Conversely, it would end the possibility of plaintiffs
seeking out the jurisdiction with the strictest defamation laws in which to
bring a cause of action. Far from abridging the freedom of press, such a
statute would clarify the laws and reduce self-censorship, in turn enhancing
press freedom.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 7.
113. See Forer, supra note 67, at 28.
114. See id. at 29. Judge Lois Forer has proposed that libel in a federal statute be defined as
"a statement that taken as a whole makes a verifiably false charge that the subject committed a
specific criminal or other degrading act." Id. This definition would allow the use of summary
judgment when a statement makes no charge of this nature.
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IV. A CASE STUDY: FIVE JURISDICTIONS USING THE PROFESSIONAL
STANDARD OF CARE".5
A. Kansas - Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co.
Exactly seven months after the United States Supreme Court announced
its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,,, 6 Kansas became the first state
to embrace the concept of "journalistic malpractice." With its holding in
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co.," 7 the Supreme Court of Kansas said that a
media defendant will be liable when he negligently publishes a false state-
ment that is defamatory on its face."' Thus, Kansas became one of the first
of many states to adopt a negligence standard in private plaintiff defamation
cases.
However, the court said the conduct to which it would compare the
defendant's would be "the conduct of the reasonably careful publisher or
broadcaster in the community or in similar communities under the existing
circumstances .... ."'9 The court cited no authority for its description of
this professional standard of care, but based its statement on basic theories
of negligence, saying "[t]he whole theory of negligence presupposes some
uniform standard of behavior for the protection of others from harm."120
The court cited the Kansas Constitution for indirect support of its adoption
of some form of negligence standard, whether simple or professional, be-
cause of its call for citizens to be responsible for the abuse of their rights to
free speech.' 2 '
The court's language saying the defendant would be judged according to
professional standards in its community "or in similar communities" seems
to have been included to allay the fear some critics expressed that the only
media outlet in a one-medium town could set its own standards of care,
115. It is interesting to note that three of the five cases in which the courts adopted a
professional standard of care for media defendants involved the defendant's allegations that the
plaintiff was engaged in some form of cruelty to animals.
116. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
117. 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
118. Id. at , 531 P.2d at 84.
119. Id.
120. Id. at -' 531 P.2d at 83.
121. Id. Section 11 of the Kansas Bill of Rights reads:
LIBERTY OF PRESS AND SPEECH; LIBEL. The liberty of the press shall be inviolate; and all
persons may freely speak, write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of such rights; and in all civil or criminal actions for libel, the truth may be
given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear that the alleged libelous matter was
published for justifiable ends, the accused party shall be acquitted.
KAN. CONST. B. of R., § 11 (emphasis added).
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resulting in insulation from liability.'2 2 Thus, a media defendant's fear that
its standards will compare unfavorably to the standards practiced by media
similarly situated across the country will serve to keep care at its highest.
In a subsequent hearing of the same case, 123 the supreme court took
further steps in establishing journalism as a profession requiring a malprac-
tice standard. In that case, the court received journalism textbooks into
evidence under the Learned Treatises exception to the hearsay rule.
124
B. Oklahoma - Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc.
The next state to adopt a professional standard of care in defamation
cases concerning private plaintiffs was Oklahoma in the case of Martin v.
Griffin Television, Inc. 125 In describing its newly adopted standard of liabil-
ity, the court said "the best evidence of the degree of care which ordinarily
prudent persons would have exercised under given circumstances is the de-
gree of care which ordinarily prudent persons, engaged in the same kind of
business, customarily have exercised and commonly do exercise under simi-
lar circumstances."' 126 The court seemed to attempt to clarify its intent that
this constitutes a professional standard of care by saying that "[o]rdinary
care under the circumstances is the same degree of care required of physi-
cians and surgeons in Oklahoma."'127 Thus, the court endorsed a form of
"journalistic malpractice" in its most literal form.
A later case characterized the adopted negligence standard as one that
"requires the recognition of the peculiar needs of the electronic and printed
media," principal among these needs being the one to avoid unnecessary
self-censorship.128
C. Utah - Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.
In February of 1981, the Supreme Court of Utah held in Seegmiller v.
KSL, Inc. 29 that "[t]he standard of due care requires only that the media
personnel act as reasonably prudent persons in the industry would act to
122. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. 229 Kan. 1, 620 P.2d 1163 (1980).
124. Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 1166 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(cc) (1979)). In this case,
the court showed that journalism's qualification as a profession can cut both ways; the Learned
Treatise evidence was submitted by the plaintiff against the media defendant.
125. 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
126. Id. at 92 (quoting Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Wilson, 172 Okla. 540, 45 P.2d 750
(1935) (quoting from Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Senske, 201 F. 637, 642 (8th Cir. 1912))).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 513-14 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
129. 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981).
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ascertain the truth." 130 So began the most articulate court enunciation to
date of the "journalistic malpractice" standard.
The Utah court went on to say "it is important to make clear that negli-
gence in this context means a departure from standards which exist or
ought to exist as standards of professional conduct in the news media indus-
try." 131 In addition, the court quoted extensively from Comment g of sec-
tion 580B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as support for its
position. 132 The quoted material included reference to the different types of
media - television, radio, newspaper and magazine - being governed by
differing considerations due to their differing circumstances.1 33
The court went on to hold that the use of expert testimony will normally
be required to avoid imposing strict liability:
Although there may be causes which are so flagrant that expert testi-
mony may not be required, the important interests to be protected,
which are founded in the First Amendment, require that juries not
be allowed to conclude that because a false, defamatory statement
was published, negligence must therefore have occurred.134
Thus, the Utah court recognized that the dual interests of first amendment
protection and jury enlightenment required expert testimony. However, it
clearly expressed its belief that avoiding infringement upon press freedom
alone is enough to warrant this extra measure of protection.
D. Georgia - Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the application of a jour-
nalistic malpractice standard in the case of Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Chumley. 135 Although the court did not discuss the use of expert testi-
mony, it based its decision in part on the affidavit of a media expert. Thus,
it is likely that the court would be receptive to testimony of expert
witnesses.
In enunciating its standard of care, the supreme court said the accepta-
ble standard of conduct would be defined by reference to the procedures a
reasonable publisher in the defendant's position would have employed prior
to publishing the material.136 More precisely, the court said the defendant
130. Id. at 974.
131. Id. at 976.
132. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B comment g).
133. 626 P.2d at 976.
134. Id.
135. 253 Ga. 179, 317 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
136. Id. at -, 317 S.E.2d at 537.
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would be "held to the skill and experience normally exercised by members
of [his] profession. Custom in the trade is relevant but not controlling."13
The Georgia court went on to lay out several factors which it authorized
a jury to consider in determining whether the defendant exercised due care;
the relative weight accorded these factors seems a likely area in which to
use expert testimony. These factors include: (1) whether the material was
topical and required prompt publication; (2) whether the material was
newsworthy and served the public interest; (3) the extent of damage that
could result if the publication is false; and (4) the reliability of the source of
the information. 138
E. Minnesota - Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.
The most recent state to adopt the professional standard of care in jour-
nalism was Minnesota in the 1985 case of Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co. 139 In that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota began by
adopting a negligence standard of liability in private plaintiff defamation
cases. 140
The court went on to clarify the standard of care by saying that
"[c]ustoms and practices within the profession are relevant in applying the
negligence standard, which is, to a substantial degree, set by the profession
itself, though custom is not controlling."' 141 The court also stressed that its
adoption of this standard was not intended to preclude a defendant from
using any absolute or qualified privileges recognized in the state. 42
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of a simple negligence standard in private plaintiff defa-
mation cases was intended to require the press to exercise reasonable care in
verifying anything it printed. Its result, however, has been to make it un-
reasonable to publish at all concerning certain subjects, and the public has
suffered the brunt of this realization.
By opting for a professional standard of care in defamation cases, sev-
eral states have recognized that protection of one right cannot be obtained
simply by punishing the exercise of another. This professional standard of
137. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B comment g).
138. Factors 1-3 are attributed to RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B. The court added
the final factor on its own initiative.
139. 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985).
140. Id. at 491.
141. Id. at 491-92 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 82, § 580B comment g).
142. Id. at 492.
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liability acknowledges the value of a free and vigorous press, as well as the
inhibitory effect of unwarranted civil liability. Thus, it imposes liability
only on those whose conduct is truly culpable, due to a failure to exercise
the skill normally present in the profession. Without such press protection,
it may well be the reasonable man who refrains from speaking.1 43
HUGH J. O'HALLORAN*
143. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
* The author would like to thank Professor Michael K. McChrystal for his guidance on this
article.
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